DAREP

Architecture Comparison · DAREP

DAREP vs. A2A vs. MCP: where each layer fits

MCP connects an agent runtime to tools. A2A exposes an organization’s live task endpoint. DAREP sits in the missing layer between independent owners: offline-durable, cryptographically receipted work delivery.

Short answer: DAREP does not replace MCP or A2A. An agent uses MCP (pull-only) to talk to its own provider, independent providers use DAREP for durable signed delivery and work-evidence records, and organizations can optionally bridge A2A at their public doorway.

1. Side-by-side comparison

The DAREP column describes the Wire v2 design, which is not yet implemented. Today’s prototype already signs work events and storage receipts as ES256 JWS with zero LLM calls on intake.

Dimension MCP A2A (v1.0) DAREP (Wire v2 draft)
Primary boundary Agent runtime ↔ local/remote tools Client ↔ live organization agent endpoint Independent provider ↔ independent provider
Offline delivery No (stateless session) Assumes reachable server; not reliable store-and-forward Yes — verify, persist durably, then issue signed receipt
Idempotency Caller-defined per tool Optional (MAY be idempotent) Mandatory (planned) — immutable JWS bytes on retry
Signed storage receipt No No (signs Agent Cards only) Yes — ES256 receipt returned with zero LLM calls
Typed work evidence No Two-party task state only Planned — separate signed facts: delivered, accepted, completed, verified
Cross-owner permissions Single-owner OAuth/token Endpoint-level auth Scoped, revocable per-agent grants distinct from owner identity

2. Why MCP alone is not cross-owner messaging

MCP is a tool-invocation protocol, not a federated delivery network. When a personal coding agent (such as Claude Code, Codex, or OpenClaw) closes its terminal, there is no persistent address or redelivery queue inside MCP itself. DAREP uses MCP strictly at the agent-to-provider boundary: a small, fixed pull-only tool set so any fresh runtime session can fetch signed work and publish responses under a scoped grant.

3. Why DAREP bridges A2A rather than tunneling inside it

A2A is designed for live two-party RPC, not offline-verifiable evidence. As verified in the A2A v1.0.1 specification, messages carry no sender field, idempotency is optional, and the spec explicitly states messages must not be treated as a reliable delivery mechanism for critical information. DAREP keeps record UUIDs and work states mechanically mappable to A2A so an organization will be able to expose a planned A2A gateway at its edge without giving up signed storage receipts or offline audit trails.

4. How all three compose in one workflow

  • Step 1 (Sender runtime → Sender provider): Alice’s agent calls an MCP tool to sign and submit a work handoff under her scoped grant.
  • Step 2 (Sender provider → Receiver provider): Alice’s provider POSTs the compact ES256 JWS envelope to Bob’s provider over DAREP. Bob’s provider verifies the signature, stores it durably with zero LLM calls, and returns a signed storage receipt.
  • Step 3 (Receiver runtime ← Receiver provider): Hours later, Bob’s fresh agent session pulls verified items over MCP, completes the work, and signs a completion event that any third party can verify offline.
  • Optional edge (Public doorway, planned): External A2A or email callers will be able to enter through an organization’s gateway extension without changing the core wire.